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Recent Developments
McIntryre v. State: TOTAliTY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
UPHEAD IN DETERMINING
VALIDITY OF A JUVENILE
MIRANDA WAIVER
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in

McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 526 A.2d 30
(1987), held that a juvenile's request to see
a parent is not a per se request for an
attorney. Consequently, once Miranda
warnings are given, the court of appeals
will still apply the totality of the circumstances test to determine if a subsequent confession is voluntary and the
Miranda waiver valid.
McIntyre involved a fifteen year old who
had been arrested and charged with rape.
When he was arrested the detectives
informed him of his Miranda rights "including the right to remain silent, to talk to
a lawyer and to have the lawyer present
during any police questioning." Id. at 609,
526 A.2d at 31. The defendant acknowledged that he comprehended these
rights but asked to see his mother. Since he
was charged as an adult, the interrogating
officer denied his request.
At the police station, the defendant was
again advised of his rights and again
indicated they were understood. At this
time he made another request to see his
mother which was also denied. After this
refusal, the defendant waived his Miranda
rights in writing. He then proceeded to
make an exculpatory statement which was
later used at trial.
During the trial, defense counsel
objected to the introduction of the Miranda waiver form, stating that McIntyre's
"requests [for his mother] were tantamount to a request for counsel because
that's how he would have gotten [sic]
counsel." Id. at 2. The trial court then held
a suppression hearing to determine if
Miranda was properly given and voluntarily waived.
When such a waiver is at issue, the state
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntary.
See State v. Kidd 181 Md. 32, 375 A.2d
1105, eert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (19n). An
important factor in proving voluntariness
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is the absence of police coercion or
intimidation, Colorado v. Connelly, 107
S.Ct. 515 (1987). Here, the interrogating
detective, Myers, testified that the defendant said he understood his Miranda
rights, appeared nervous but not frightened, was not flustered or excited, and that
his request to see his mother was "just a
matter of fact question, and not an emotional request." McIntyre, 309 Md. at 610,
526 A.2d at 31. Myers also testified that
there were not threats or promises made to
the defendant to induce him to waive his
Miranda rights. Furthermore, Myers testified that McIntyre never asked to see an
attorney.
The trial court applying the totality of
the circumstances test, denied the suppression motion. Additionally, the trial judge
stated that a juvenile does not have a right
to have a parent present when a statement,
is made. Id, 309 Md. at 611, 526 A.2d at 32.
After conviction, the defendant appealed
to the court of special appeals which held
that as long as the statement is voluntary,
a parent's absence has "no bearing on the
admissibility of the voluntary statement."
Id. Due to the importance of the issue as to
whether the denial of parental access to a
fifteen year old violates the fifth and sixth
amendments, the court of appeals granted
certiorari.
The defendant's counsel argued for the
adoption of a per se rule, that involves the
Miranda request for counsel, whenever a
juvenile asks to see his parents or another
interested adult. The court of appeals
rejected this argument stating that the per
se rule established in Miranda was that a
lawyer is the person who is in the best
position to protect the fifth amendment
rights of a client undergoing custodial
interrogation. Fare v. Michael
442 U.S.
707,719, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
Therefore, this per se rule distinguishes a
request for a probation officer or close
friend from a request for counsel. Id at 722.
In Fare, a sixteen year old under custodial interrogation requested to speak with
his probation officer, a person he trusted.
The court rejected Fare's per se argument,
indicating that probation officers are not
usually versed in the law and they could
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not properly advise the juvenile. This
reasoning is similar to the case at bar,
where there was "[no] evidence to show
that McIntyre's mother would have been
able to advise him of his legal rights."
McIntyre, 309 Md. at 626, 526 A.2d at 39.
Another reason for refusing to expand
Miranda's reach is that a request for any
trusted individual could be deemed a
request for counsel. This would circumvent part of Miranda's goal, which is to
allow suspects the opportunity of acquiring legal advice. (emphasis added).
To determine if a waiver is valid, it must
be done voluntarily and without police
coercion of any kind. North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, (1979). To determine voluntariness, the totality of the circumstances test is used, even where a
juvenile is involved. Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at
724-5. The factors examined are: the suspects age, intelligence, education, experience, suggestibility, and mental and
physical health; the police officer's treatment of the suspect; and the methods and
length of interrogation. Lodowski v. State,
307 Md. 233, 254-55, 513 A.2d 299 (1986).
In the present case, the trial record
reflected that the defendant understood his
rights, was not confused, the questioning
was brief, the statement was exculpatory,
he was of normal intelligence to understand his rights, no threats or promises
were made and probably most importantly, there was never a request to see an
attorney. McIntyre, 309 Md. at 526 A.2d
38. The court noted that age is a factor, but
"age in itself, does not render a confession
involuntary." Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362,
379, 247 A.2d 520 (1968). The court further observed that a child who is arrested
must have his parents notified, but declined to rule on whether a child who is charged as an adult has such a right.
The court of appeals did observe that a
few jurisidictions do equate a "juvenile's
request to see their parents with requests
to consult an attorney." See, e.g., People v.
Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793,99 Cal.
Rept 1 (1971).
Nevertheless, the court rejected the per
se approach and decided to continue using
the totality of the circumstances test

because it allows for consideration of other
factors which serve to better protect the
interests of society and of justice. Mdntyre,
309 Md. at 622, 623, 526 A.2d at 37. (citing
from Com fJ. Christmas, 502 Pa. 213, 465
A.2d 989, 992 (1983». Applying this test,
the court found that the defendant's "mere
requests to see his mother, [under] the circumstances, [did not] factually constitute
an invocation of his right to remain silent,
"nor did it invoke his right to counsel." Id
at 625, 526 A.2d at 39.
There was a lengthy and strongly worded dissent filed by Judge Adkins. The dissent argued that even if a juvenile appears
mature, etc., he cannot be held to understand the full ramifications of being
arrested. Other jurisdictions provide safeguards for juveniles including a per se rule
invalidating waivers, See, e.g., People fJ. Bur·
ton, supra and special legislation, See, e.g.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§466-136 and 466137 (West 1987). (holding inadmissible
confessions, statements or admissions
made by a juvenile unless made in the presence of a parent or guardian) Mdntyre, 309
Md. at 629, 526 A.2d at 40 (Adkins, J. dissenting). The dissent was adamant that
Mdntyre's repeated requests for his mother
should have been treated as a request for a
lawyer.
Furthermore, even by using the totality
of the circumstances test, the state failed to
show that Mdntyre had the necessary intelligence, knowledge, maturity or any previous experience with the criminal justice
system. 309 Md. at 635, 526 A.2d at 44.
The court observed that Lodo'Wski dictates
an adequate record is of utmost importance to determine if there was a constitutional waiver or. rights. Id at 636, 526 A.2d
at 44. Since the trial record was notably
scant, the dissent urged that the conviction
be reversed and a new trial be held.
The court of appeals' ruling appears to
be stating that when a juvenile is charged
as an adult, he or she will be considered an
adult even under the totality of the circumstances test. Also, the court will not
consider age by itself, but will look to
other outside factors in determining if a
valid waiver of Miranda rights has been
made.

-Robert Feldman

Booth v. Maryland: VICTIM IMPACT
STATEMENTS INADMISSABLE AT

SENTENCING HEARING IN
CAPITAL MURDER CASE
In Booth fJ. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529
(1987), the Supreme Court of the United
States in a 5-4 decision, delivered by Justice
Powell, rejected the introduction of victim

impact statements (VIS) at the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial. The Court
reasoned that such information was irrelevant to the blameworthiness of a particular
defendant and therefore violative of the
eighth- amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. In rejecting
the consideration of the VIS, the Court
invalidated a Maryland statute to the
extent that it mandated the compilation of
a VIS in all felony cases.
In Booth, the victims, Irvin and Rose
Bronstein were robbed and brutally murdered in their West Baltimore home by
John Booth and Willie Reid. Booth, a
neighbor of the elderly couple apparently
entered the home to steal money in order
to purchase heroin. Due to Booth's fear of
identification by the victims, he and Reid
gagged the Bronsteins and then stabbed
them repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Two
days later, the Bronsteins' son discovered
the bodies of his murdered parents.
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts
of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.
Prior to the sentencing phase of the trial,
the State Division of Parole and Probation
submitted a presentence report which
described Booth's background, employment history, education, and criminal
record. Pursuant to Md. Ann. Code art.
41, § 4-609(c) (1986), the presentence
report included a VIS, describing the
detrimental effects of the crime on the victim's family and society in general.
Defense counsel moved to suppress the
VIS on the ground that it was "irrelevant
and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital case violated the
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Booth. 107 S.Ct. at 2532. Denying
the motion, the trial court submitted the
information to the jury, who subsequently
sentenced Booth to death. On automatic
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed both the conviction and the sentencing decision. Booth fJ. State. 306 Md.
172,507 A.2d 1098 (1986). The court, relying on Lodowski '0. State, 302 Md. 691, 490
A.2d 1228 (1985) concluded that the VIS
was not an arbitrary factor in the sentencing process, but rather an informative
technique by which the sentencing body
could measure the full extent of the harm
caused by the perpetrator of the crime.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Justice Powell distinguished between the
use of a VIS in an ordinary civil or
criminal case as opposed to the unique circumstance of a capital sentencing hearing.
A VIS, in the vast majority of cases, provides the jury with two types of informa-

tion. Initially, it describes the personal
characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime(s) on the family.
Secondly, it sets forth the family members'
opinions and characterizations of the
crimes and the defendant. Booth, 107 U.S.
at 2533. In Booth, the VIS was based on
interviews with the Bronsteins' son,
daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter.
The interviewer, an employee of the Division of Parole and Probation, compiled the
information, comments and reactions of
the family and prepared a VIS which was
then considered by the jury during their
deliberation of Booth's sentence.
The Court, in evaluating all plausible
arguments as to the relevancy and effectiveness of the VIS, discusses several potentially unconstitutional results which
illustrated the danger of allowing juries to
consider this information. First, the Court
noted that the function of the sentencing
jury is to "express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of
life or death." Witherspoon 'V. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 (1968). In so doing, the jury
is required to focus on the particular defendant as a "uniquely individual human
bein[g]." Woodson fJ. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Applying this rationale, the Court explained that "the focus of
a VIS is not on the defendant, but on the
character and reputation of the victim and
the effect on his family. These factors may
be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. Booth,
107 S.Ct. at 2534. "Allowing the jury to
rely on a VIS therefore could result in
imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the
decision to kilL" Id. Consequently, the
Court found that the nature of the information contained in a VIS created an
impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision would be made in an arbitrary
manner.
Secondly, the Court addressed the dangers of imposing the death penalty based
ont he ability of the family members to
articulate their grief and the extent of their
loss. U[I]n some cases the victim will not
leave behind a family, or the family members may be less articulate in describing
their feelings even though their sense of
loss is equally severe." Id. The fact that the
imposition of the death penalty could turn
on such unfair distinctions posed constitutional problems for the Court.
Finally, the Court examined the difficulty of rebutting the implications of the VIS,
without shifting the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant.
"Presumably the defendant would have
the right to cross-examine the declarants,
Fal~
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